Русский
Russia has been participating in the annual East Asia Summit in Vientiane, Laos, with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov representing the Russian Federation. Other attendees included all the ASEAN nations (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) together with Australia, Japan, South Korea, the European Union and the United States.
The normal protocol at the conclusion of such summits is the issuing of a joint declaration, designed to illustrate bloc unity. This did not occur at this summit, with Russia and China objecting to the wording. In a subsequent, open Q&A session, Lavrov explains the reasons why and comments on regional issues. His remarks are reproduced below under the initials SL, independent questions asked at the press conference are identified as Q; our analysis is provided under the initials RPA.
SL: “We have completed our meetings as part of the 19th East Asia Summit. President of Russia Vladimir Putin instructed me to represent him at this event. The discussions demonstrated that our Western colleagues, who are ASEAN partners, just like Russia, China and India – these Western colleagues have been seeking to undermine the multilateral economic and security architecture which has evolved over decades with ASEAN at its core and which has proven its relevance and effectiveness.
However, it is obvious today that the United States and its allies decided to draw the Asia-Pacific Region into NATO’s sphere of interests by creating narrow and exclusive US-led military and political associations. This includes the troika formed by the United States, Japan and South Korea. There is also the United States, Japan and the Philippines trio. For the Indo-Pacific, they created the Quad, which includes Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Japan. All this does nothing to promote collective efforts, while fragmenting this common space by dividing it into friends and foes.
We have highlighted that this Western policy may lead to the region’s militarisation, while also threatening stability and sustainable development in the Asian part of our shared continent.”
RPA: This is express criticism of Western policy that seeks to introduce creeping militarisation into the East Asia region, mainly on the basis of containing China, the regional dominant force. Russia and China view this as an escalation of Western military expansion and influence into Asia, leading to an increase in potential regional conflicts.
SL: “Russia reaffirmed its unwavering support for ASEAN countries in their efforts to preserve peace and ensure equal cooperation with all ASEAN partners. The West though wants to make ASEAN its main partner. And the primary purpose of this partnership would be to oppose Russia’s and China’s interests. In terms of Russia’s relations with ASEAN, for more than three decades, we have been building our strategic cooperation with this association based on an independent agenda free from any momentary political considerations. Next year, we will be marking the 20th anniversary of the first Russia-ASEAN summit and the adoption of the Joint Declaration on Progressive and Comprehensive Partnership at it.”
RPA: Lavrov pointing out that the Russian involvement in ASEAN has historically not been driven by military or political rivalry interests but on trade.
SL: “Instead of using the events held as part of the East Asia Summit for pursuing vested political interests, Russia opted for promoting initiatives in several domains, including pandemic response, people-to-people contacts, including tourism, and supporting volunteering. We offer practical avenues for working together which can benefit all the participants and advocate equal and mutually beneficial cooperation. During this meeting, we tabled a proposal to work together on developing remote territories. This is an important topic for us, just as for many ASEAN countries.
During these, we set forth and circulated our overall perspective regarding cultural and social connectivity, which has become especially relevant considering the spread of destructive ideologies and attempts to blur and eliminate the traditional values.
Quite a few ideas we heard from our ASEAN colleagues on reinforcing the regional architecture can be viewed as complementary with Russia’s well-known initiative to create an architecture of indivisible security and equitable development for Eurasia.
The Association hosted the Secretary-General of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as its guest at the East Asia Summit for the third time. He put forward a positive proposal to promote closer contacts between the SCO and ASEAN in various spheres that are relevant for the countries involved. We could see that the SCO and ASEAN are natural partners not only in terms of their geography, but also considering the firm commitment by their member countries to the principles of sovereign and mutually beneficial cooperation while taking into account each other’s interests.
We welcomed the fact that several ASEAN countries want to forge closer ties with BRICS. Today, this structure acts as one of the cornerstones of a multipolar world order. In just a few days, Kazan will be hosting the BRICS Summit, which will be a major international event. Several ASEAN countries were invited to attend it, and they accepted these invitations.
We have no doubt that the approaches we develop within BRICS for dealing with various topical matters can also serve the participants in the East Asia summits, especially ASEAN member states.”
Q: What or who has prevented the adoption of the final statement?
SL: “In a nutshell, the final declaration has not been adopted because of the persistent attempts by the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand to turn it into a purely political statement, contrary to the decades-long practice of East Asia summits, which boils down to preventing the saturation of declarations with confrontational geopolitical narratives. For the past years, these declarations focused on practical cooperation in the economy, trade, investment, and the humanitarian sphere. It is obvious to everyone that the attempts to politicise these spheres of work are counterproductive.
Last year, we adopted the East Asia Summit Plan of Action. This year, we submitted a number of practical proposals aimed at implementing projects in the spheres stipulated in that plan.
The West systematically hindered these actions, demanding that we assume responsibility for all the developments in Ukraine, where the United States and its allies provoked a state coup and have been supporting the activities of the criminal Kiev regime since then. This is the main reason. The ASEAN nations fully realise that this cannot promote cooperation in the format of the East Asia summits.”
RPA: The implication here is that Australia, the European Union and the United States wanted to include text in the East Asia Summit declaration that condemned Russian activities in Ukraine.
Q: When commenting on the results of the Russia-ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting held here, in Laos, in July 2024, you said that the Association supported the idea and appreciated Russia’s advocacy of an ASEAN-centric architecture in the region. Which ASEAN actions does Russia appreciate in the context of its regional concerns?
SL: “For the Association’s central role. We are convinced that the reinforcement of its central role, which is a tough job when our Western colleagues are trying to split ASEAN, calls for a great deal of political will. The ASEAN countries certainly have it.”
RPA: Russia’s position is that the West is trying to split opinion within ASEAN. As concerns Ukraine, ASEAAN has maintained a politically neutral position. Russia views Ukraine as a subject that should be off the table in terms of East Asia discussions.
Q: Shortly before the summit, the new prime minister of Japan proposed creating an Asian analogue of NATO. He said that new conflicts were possible in the region otherwise. What could be threatening the region, and what can be done to repel these threats?
SL: “Any form of militarisation and any proposals regarding new military blocs come laden with the risk of confrontation, which can develop into a “hot phase.” As for Japan, we are seriously concerned about its re-militarisation. Having forgotten the lessons of WWII, the Japanese authorities have stated increasing defence spending and augmenting its basic doctrines with a pre-emptive strike capability.
Japan is increasing its involvement in the US global ballistic defence plans, with the possible deployment of intermediate – and shorter-range ground-launched missiles in Japan. Overall, it is gearing up for strengthening its military capability in both traditional and new spheres, such as cyberspace and outer space.
Japan is taking part in more naval exercises with the United States and other NATO countries. Work is underway to align narrow bloc formats. One is the Japan-South Korea-US partnership, and the other is the US-Japan-Philippines platform, which is being established.
Japan has openly declared readiness to take part in joint nuclear missions with the US and interest in joining the AUKUS project. This entails obvious risks. We regularly discuss this at the IAEA. This clear refusal to abandon the path of peaceful development is a matter of concern for us. This could lead to the collapse of the current global architecture and its replacement with the “rules-based order,” about which the Japanese prime minister spoke at length at our meeting today. This policy is being actively and openly encouraged by the United States.
The US Ambassador to Japan has recently said that the United States was thinking of creating a “trade defence coalition” of approximately 50 countries in the Asia-Pacific Region to “isolate Beijing economically.” In other words, aggression and confrontation are not only encouraged in the military-political sphere but also in the economy, thereby hindering the universal idea to promoting inclusive formats of mutually beneficial economic cooperation.”
RPA: Russia expressing in some detail its unhappiness with Japan’s trend towards militarisation and inclusion in a Western military alliance in East Asia.
Q: You have mentioned the interest of ASEAN countries in BRICS. Did any of the countries express their interest in joining BRICS here on the sidelines of the ASEAN events?
SL: “This subject was not raised at the plenary sessions. But as I said, a number of ASEAN countries have been invited to the BRICS Summit in Kazan on October 22-24. They accepted the invitations. So, you will see them all there.”
RPA: Lavrov is being coy here. Our understanding is that numerous ASEAN countries have made official enquiries as concerns BRICS membership, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam. Collectively, these represent the largest economies in ASEAN.
Q: Even before this summit, the US press wrote that the United States would try to put the conflict in the South China Sea and the conflict in Ukraine at the forefront of the debate. Did they succeed?
SL: “They tried, but the attempt met no response among ASEAN members. Participants from the pro-Western group, including Japan, New Zealand and Australia, echoed the US rhetoric, but this did not have any actual effect on the discussion. In real life, the United States is building military-political alliances of a closed bloc nature. This policy is aimed at containing both China and Russia.
The South China Sea issue was raised quite often in participants’ statements. Chinese Premier Li Qiang, who represented Beijing at the event, reaffirmed his interest in having all issues relating to the territorial disputes in the South China Sea resolved on the international legal basis – specifically, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea – and in the framework of the ongoing negotiations between China and ASEAN. The parties have already adopted two statements on the principles that should guide their further work. They are now close to an agreement on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.”
RPA: The West has been critical and dismissive of Chinese claims in the South China Sea, parts of which are disputed between China and several ASEAN nations, including the Philippines and Vietnam. This criticism has led to calls for US military involvement in the area ‘to protect shipping’, which China vehemently opposes. In terms of a Code of Conduct agreement, this may not be as close as Lavrov suggests, China has consistently delayed signing such a document.
Q: You have earlier mentioned that Washington blocked the adoption of the EAS final declaration. Nevertheless, does the United States really continue to use the East Asia Summit platform to fight Russia and China?
SL: “That is right. These are the goals of their current policy to promote a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” This is a paradoxical slogan, given that all practical steps taken by the United States and its allies are aimed at shutting out Russia and China and winning over as many ASEAN members as possible to their side. Washington is actively wooing the Philippines now. The concept the United States is currently guided by makes no mention of any “free and open” Indo-Pacific region whatsoever.
When the United States and its allies unanimously reaffirmed their commitment to ASEAN’s central role in facilitating cooperation in the region today, they were being dishonest, to put it mildly. In fact, everything they do is aimed at containing Russia and China. Everything that has been accomplished in the ASEAN-centric format over decades is being sacrificed to this goal now. That format was convenient for everyone and incorporated the interests of each and every stakeholder. So, the destructive nature of Washington’s actions in the region is obvious.”
RPA: Russia detailing US attempts to ‘split’ ASEAN into countries friendly towards the West and countries friendly towards China, with no grey area in between. However, collectively, ASEAN has a Free Trade Agreement with China and is its largest trade partner.
Q: Two days ago, the Ukrainian ambassador to Turkiye said that, according to his information, a peace conference on Ukraine may be held in December. Do you think Russia should react to this kind of hint-dropping, given that the US presidential election results will be announced in November?
SL: “We do not follow the statements made by Ukrainian representatives from time to time at various levels. We are not interested. President Putin laid out our stance very clearly when he spoke at the Foreign Ministry on June 14. This policy is being consistently implemented. We will see the matter through to the end.”
Q: The European media continue to comment on Ukraine. In particular, Italy’s Corriere della Sera wrote that Vladimir Zelensky could agree to a ceasefire on current frontlines if he is given security guarantees by the United States and accelerated accession to the European Union. How would you comment on the fact that such statements are aired by the media, and on the tone and content of these publications?
SL: “To be honest, I have no comment on this. Some news pops up every day like a jack-in-the-box. Vladimir Zelensky says one thing today and quite another thing tomorrow, when his administration – or whatever they call it, the office of the President of Ukraine – corrects him.
I see no point in following this. When politicians are serious, this can be seen in real deeds, on the ground. They make practical steps. Right now, what we see on the ground is our armed forces consistently achieving the objectives planned. So far, we have not heard anything serious in politicians’ statements.”
RPA: Blunt rebuff for questions about Ukraine in the context of the US elections and European media coverage.
Q: According to official statements, Iran’s parliament is seriously considering the possibility of the country’s withdrawal from the NPT in anticipation of a possible retaliatory missile strike by Israel. Do you think that if Iran withdraws from this treaty, its next step could be to create nuclear weapons? What are the chances international players will succeed in persuading Israel to refrain from a new missile attack on Iran?
SL: “I think you have four what-ifs here. If something happens, and if someone reacts to it in a certain way. We prefer to rely on facts, as I said in answering the previous question. Every country has politicians or parliamentarians who make statements that do not reflect their government’s hands-on strategy or official policy. We have seen many examples of this.
As for the actual state of affairs, the IAEA, which monitors Iran’s nuclear programme quite closely, sees no indication of Iran beginning to shift it towards a military dimension. These assessments are regularly submitted to the Board of Governors. We rely on these professional assessments.
But if any plans or threats to attack the peaceful nuclear facilities of Iran were to be carried out, it would amount to a serious provocation.”
RPA: Lavrov tried to stick to issue related to East Asia in the Q&A, but inevitably was called to comment on issues in Iran and as concerns China’s position in the South China Sea. That in itself is of relevance as it illustrates that Russia is still seen as a necessary sounding board against the United States involvement in global conflicts. As regards East Asia, there is distinct unhappiness at the United States attempts to divide ASEAN members into different US and China camps, with ASEAN countries themselves having previously stated they do not want to be made to choose sides. Nonetheless, Washington apparently continues to prod, and pose this status, creating difficulties for ASEAN in determining its own course without external Western influence. In this context, the decision not to issue a collective declaration on the 2024 outcomes of the East Asia Summit probably suited the West’s position rather than that of Russia and China. Lavrov’s frustration was apparent, if somewhat resigned.
Further Reading
