Русский
The United States 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) has just been released, with responses ranging from political shock and disbelief to celebratory approval, depending on where you’re positioned on the branches of the global geopolitical tree. Its format is closer to a sales prospectus than most US official government-supported documents, resulting in the feel of a sales promotional white paper rather than a project designed to find balanced global dignity.
The NSS is a periodic document spelling out the United States’s foreign policy and security, although its appearance is intermittent – it has been published annually since 1987, but frequently reports come in late or not at all, suggesting a lack of seriousness concerning delivery. Nonetheless, in these strange, uncertain times, the latest NSS will be pored over by geopolitical strategists looking for clues. In this review, we concentrate on the comments made specifically about Asia, the Middle East, and Africa and leave the “Western” analysis to those concerned with such matters.
The 2025 NSS has emphasized the need for US “pre-eminence” in the Western Hemisphere, reflecting President Donald Trump’s push for regional dominance. It does state that Europe lacks “civilizational self-confidence and Western identity.” Brussels and London should watch out. These are clear statements against contemporary, often controversial cultural trends (such as wokeness) and migration (which has already occurred, with European efforts morally applaudable yet woefully prepared). But let’s take a look at what US security policy appears to be as concerns Russia and the Global South:
China
The new NSS has called for balancing trade with China while also deterring it from seizing Taiwan. But unlike the previous Biden administration-issued NSS, this one does not focus primarily on China or mark competition with Beijing as the top challenge for Washington.
The last two National Security Strategies, including the one released during Trump’s first term in the White House, described competition with China as a top priority for the US. But the rivalry with Beijing was not put front and center in this updated document, although it does highlight the need to win economic competition in Asia and to rebalance trade with China.
To that end, it stressed the need for the United States to “work” with Asian allies to provide a counterweight to Beijing, singling out India. The 2025 NSS says that “We must continue to improve commercial and other relations with India to encourage New Delhi to contribute to Indo-Pacific security.”
That is a reference to the Quad alliance that includes the US, India, Australia and Japan and is designed to keep an eye on China. While Delhi will probably maintain this relationship, to keep Beijing on its toes – and extract money from the US military to do so – its own relationship with China is improving.
Both Beijing and Delhi appear to have recognised that the joint attempts to cancel each other out, militarily and commercially in global trade are a dead end. But US trade relations could be. Washington has threatened tariffs on China and retains a 50% embargo on Indian imports. Such behaviour is not really conducive to good US-India relations, which is one reason why Vladimir Putin was so warmly received in Delhi. That reception may mean that this NSS is already redundant.
Nonetheless, the document spelled out the risks of China seizing Taiwan by force, noting that the self-governing island, which Beijing claims as its own, is a major producer of computer chips. It also underscored that capturing Taiwan would give China use of the Second Island Chain in the Asia Pacific and bolster its position in the South China Sea, a vital artery for US West Coast trade. It states that “Deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority.”
That ‘mismatch’ is of concern to Beijing, and not necessarily in terms of providing a deterrent against any US aggression. The greater concern is that the Taiwanese islands extend to within just a few km from the Chinese mainland. That is the equivalent of China or NATO placing weapons next to the Russian border or the Russians placing missiles in Cuba.
We feel that the likelihood of a China-Taiwan conflict is very low – although the US is certainly stirring the pot. Mainland China is Taiwan’s largest trade partner by far – representing 31.7% of all Taiwanese trade and investment, Hong Kong is second with 11.3%, the United States at 23.4% (mainly through weapons sales) and ASEAN with 18.5%.
The US strategy in Taiwan, meanwhile, remains familiar – sell weapons to a client that is easily scared, and to wind up Beijing. Will Xi Jinping mind too much? Probably not. US military support for Taiwan keeps the Chinese military – and especially its navy – on its toes and helps keep China at the forefront of weapons technological development and trade. China is now the world’s fourth-largest weapons exporter (Russia is third and France second – a good reason why Macron is pro-Ukraine conflict).
India
India is barely mentioned apart from the reference to its membership of the ‘Quad’ alliance mentioned above. However, given that India has also just signed the ‘RELOS’ (Reciprocal Exchange of Logistics Agreement) agreement with Russia appears to reveal that India is not going to play 100% ball with US requests. RELOS is a bilateral military logistics pact between India and Russia that allows their armed forces to access each other’s military facilities for refuelling, repairs, supplies, berthing, and maintenance. It means that the Russian Navy also now has access to the ‘Indo-Pacific’ region that the NSS refers to. It’s doubtful that Washington was aware of this before their document was drafted. Modi has been a very canny operator.
Asia
The remarks concerning Asia are odd, not least because the NSS refers to it as the “Indo-Pacific”, a recently adopted US political term that appears to suggest that the entire North and South American west coasts, as well as all of Asia, extend into the Indian Ocean as its remit. That is an area that reaches from coastal Peru to Kenya. It is clearly an absurd assumption, although presumably meant to draw India in as APEC influential.
The document then continues to discuss the prevention of war in the Asia-Pacific region, despite there being no actual conflict extant at this time, although China’s incursions into the South China Sea occasionally ruffle feathers in the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam.
But then again, these are major markets for Chinese goods, and although Beijing can display some annoying behaviour at times, it isn’t in China’s economic interests to provoke conflict and disrupt trade flows. With a population of 1.4 billion requiring an increasingly affluent lifestyle comparable to the West, China really cannot afford regional disruptions. But the document does imply that it could be in US interests to provoke such behaviour. We can expect some US nonsense as regards the possibility of US-designed conflicts between China and ASEAN and further sabre rattling as regards Taiwan.
The Middle East
The NSS document is historically disparaging about the Middle East, describing its past as “thankfully over – it is no longer the constant irritant that it once was” and claims that the Abraham Accords (true) and the strikes on Iran (untrue) have fostered a new region ready to embrace the United States. Apart from the historical faux pas – most of the Middle East is influenced by long-standing family dynasties, with many of them kingdoms – the overall prognosis is generally positive. It credits US President Trump with this turnaround, stating, “The Middle East is emerging as a place of partnership, friendship, and investment—a trend that should be welcomed and encouraged. In fact, President Trump’s ability to unite the Arab world at Sharm el-Sheikh in pursuit of peace and normalization will allow the United States to finally prioritize American interests.”
The fact that Sharm el-Sheikh, while being part of the Arab world but actually in North Africa (Egypt) appears lost in the NSS rhetoric. We also note the emphasis on “American interests” rather than any specific policy to encourage, develop or otherwise engage with the Middle Eastern region.
Africa
Africa is also dealt with on a somewhat perfunctory basis, with the NSS stating that the United States should concentrate on ‘select’ countries (which is an upgrade from the previous Trump comment about African ‘shithole’). ’countries and “transition from a foreign aid paradigm to an investment and growth paradigm capable of harnessing Africa’s abundant natural resources.” In other words, the United States wants to recreate the European colonial era in Africa.
Money always talks in Africa, but the people are rather better educated now and rather more patriotic than perhaps in the colonial era past. Africa has already been courted, quite successfully by Russia, China and India, And while we applaud US attempts to invest, we feel this will be a rocky road. If the United States cannot sustainably deal with Cuba, Mexico or Venezuela in their own backyard, what chance do they have in Africa?
Latin America
In LatAm, the document somewhat disparagingly refers to the continent as “Non-Hemispheric” and claims that “competitors have made major inroads into our Hemisphere, to disadvantage us economically, and in ways that may harm us.” It also appears to threaten additional sanctions by stating, “We should accelerate these efforts (to combat lower-cost competition) by utilizing U.S. leverage in finance.” Readers may refer to the unfolding issues as concerns about Venezuela and the as-yet-unresolved issue of 50% tariffs placed earlier this year upon Brazilian imports as exactly following these directives.
The attitude towards LatAm is clear, as the document states, “The choice all countries should face is whether they want to live in an American-led world of sovereign countries and free economies or in a parallel one in which they are influenced by countries on the other side of the world.” That implies further pressure ahead, specifically for Brazil, the primary LatAm economy and a founding member of BRICS.
Russia
Russia is mentioned briefly in this NSS and then only in the context of Europe and Ukraine. It does, however, state that “Europe now observes Russia as an existential threat” and that the United States should assist Europe to “re-establish strategic stability with Russia”. It is also somewhat damning of Europe itself, saying that “A large European majority wants peace, yet that desire is not translated into policy, in large measure because of those governments’ subversion of democratic processes. Our goal should be to help Europe correct its current trajectory.”
This document was signed off by President Trump and appears to mirror the current US attitudes as regards European involvement in Ukraine. It implies not a change of authority in Russia, but US policy desire to usher in a change of authority in Europe.
Conflict & Resource Ambiguity
The NSS also states that the United States will “assert and enforce to keep the Western Hemisphere safe and free of hostile foreign ownership of key assets”. There, we have in a nutshell what appears to be the essence of this document. While paying lip service to most of the rest of the world, it also says that the United States will ‘enforce’ its right to ‘foreign ownership of key assets’.
The message could not be clearer: regardless of where those assets are (as this is not specified), the United States will, if necessary, use force to claim what it wants. The NSS even spells out what the United States wants:
- To win wars;
- To develop a defense-related production capacity;
- To be unapologetic about our country’s past and present;
- A Western Hemisphere that remains free of hostile foreigners or their ownership of assets;
- To ensure the US continued access to key strategic locations.
The implications of these key points are remarkably clear without the need for further comment.
This 2025 strategy therefore treats all other countries as being subject, even subservient, to American involvement, including war, while insisting on the strict insulation of American domestic politics from any foreign influence. This asymmetry reveals a worldview in which cultural politics becomes an instrument of statecraft. It positions the United States as the sole judge of what assets are its right to claim, regardless of their actual jurisdiction or ownership.
The document specifically calls the cultivating of American industrial strength “the highest priority of national economic policy”, with a strong manufacturing base described as essential to both peacetime and wartime power. It promises to rebalance trade, secure critical supply chains so the United States is “never dependent on any outside power” for key defence or economic inputs, and position the US energy sector as a leading export engine. Industrial policy, tariffs, and supply chain controls are therefore not separate from strategy.
Together, these takeaways point to a US national security strategy that fuses “America First” economic and immigration policy, an assertive “Western Hemispheric” doctrine, and domestic political objectives into a single organizing framework.
Summary
It is unclear how much this matters in practice. All the principles put forth in this strategy have been said many times before by President Trump and his inner circle. For both allies and adversaries, the shock is not so much the specific policies but the message that the United States now sees its security in a more personal, self-focused, and straitened way than previous iterations.
It also raises the question of whether these specific perceptions of national security will survive successive administrations. That depends on how the domestic US political and democratic movement pans out. The somewhat unfortunate message to the rest of the world is “You don’t matter.” That is a complete adherence to the unipolar global society that now excludes everyone else – including Europe – and is a 180-degree opposite from the ‘multipolar’ society envisaged by Russia and most of Asia.
The overriding question this document raises is this: “Is the United States globally friendly?” The answer appears to be: “Only if you agree with it.”
Further Reading
