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The European Union (EU) has a rotating Presidency, alternating every six months between member states. Currently held by Poland, then to be taken over by Denmark for July-December this year, the Presidency gives each member state the ability to press its own government agendas and acts as a conduit for the country concerned to express its opinions on matters concerning EU policy.
What is interesting about the upcoming Presidency roles is who will be holding them – none are major economies and all have political and trade aspects concerning Russia. This will have an impact in how the EU decides to later manage its relations with Moscow and indeed how to handle the issue of sanctions.
While Poland will hold the current EU line, we can examine the upcoming EU Presidencies and see what influences there may be from now until the end of 2030.
Denmark: July-December 2025
Denmark’s relations with Russia are mostly concerned with the Arctic, with the two countries being full members of the Arctic Council, which has recently begun to include Russia again after an initial suspension. Denmark will want to discuss Arctic navigational issues and shipping. Bilateral trade between the two nations has never been huge – €355 million in 2022 – but this did include shipbuilding materials in both directions and some fishing catch. If Denmark has eyes on using the North Sea Route to Asia it will need to improve relations with Moscow.
Cyprus: January-June 2026
Cyprus has been badly hit by sanctions imposed upon Russia, with hundreds of Russian offshore companies both registered and listed there relocating to other emerging offshore financial centres such as Dubai and Almaty, or to Russian SEZ’s such as Vladivostok. The tourism sector has also been badly hit while Russia also cancelled a lucrative double tax treaty. It remains to be seen whether the Cypriot offshore industry can ever recover its previous Russian client base, but it will certainly be pushing for some type of restoration, as will the tourism sector.
Ireland: July-December 2026
Ireland lost its Russian aircraft leasing business, while several other Irish businesses ceased operations in the country, including brand names such as Guiness and Diagio, although parallel imports mean their products can still be found in Russia. A major Irish export to Russia is aluminium oxide. Bilateral trade in 2023 was about €570 million and remained constant during 2024, although Ireland will follow the main EU policy and is unlikely to enhance trade with Moscow.
Lithuania: January-June 2027
As one of the Baltic states, Lithuania has been highly aggressive in its critical decisions about Russia and has been heavily involved in putting on sanctions pressure. However, there are significant fault lines – the current population of Lithuania includes about 5% ethnic Russians, with many businesses previously reliant on Russian trade. Internally, Lithuania may face political pressures to restore better trade relations with Russia, putting the current government potentially at odds with its own people. Political issues such as the permitting of dual nationalities have also yet to be resolved despite polls suggesting most Lithuanians would support this. In 2023, Lithuanian exporters sent €2.21 billion of produce to Russia. By 2024 that halved as Vilnius introduced more sanctions. Lithuanian exporters will be wanting that market back.
Greece: July-December 2027
Greece is another traditionally pro-Russian country, with long established ties via the Eastern Orthodox Church and the Cyrillic alphabet. Its trade and tourism market from Russia has been badly damaged by EU sanctions policies, with many Greeks keen to see this return. The new Greek President has been highly critical of Russia, although the business community may see things rather differently. Bilateral trade reached €3.43 billion in 2022, by 2024 this had decreased to €2.01 billion. Russian tourism volumes to Greece have dropped from 1 million arrivals in 2018 to just 32,000 in 2023. Differences of opinion in Athens can be expected to be substantial.
Italy: January-June 2028
The Italian business community is also pro-Russian, with the two countries sharing many cultural ties. The incumbent government however has been highly critical of Russia. However, the business community has taken a hit, with sanctions imposed on Russia meaning that Italian exports to Russia dropped from €5.8 billion in 2022 to €3.6 billion in 2024. Russian tourist arrivals are also down, from 1.6 million in 2018 to 900,000 in 2024. Rome can also be expected to showcase differences between the wishes of the politicians and those of the Italian business community.
Latvia: July-December 2028
Latvian politics are decidedly anti-Russian, although the country has an ethnic, Russian speaking population making up about 10% of Latvia’s total. This also creates societal dividing lines. Latvia has been Russian-dependent as regards electricity supplies, however, has recently disconnected itself from this and connected instead to EU supply networks. There has been however a noticeable and immediate increase in Latvian consumer energy bills which may lead Latvians to question the governments Russia policies. Curiously, Latvian exports to Russia have increased from 2021 to 2024, reaching €1.21 billion last year, mainly as a result of transiting other European goods through to Russian ports, a loophole that the government is also looking to close.
Luxembourg: January-June 2029
Luxembourg is another European tax haven that was badly impacted by the loss of Russian capital being parked in the jurisdiction amidst the imposition of EU sanctions. Numerous Russian businesses are involved in multi-billion euro lawsuits to recover assets, and upcoming court hearings regarding frozen assets in the country will become headline news over the coming years. Luxembourg will follow EU regulations and policies lest it attract too much attention, however its Russian client business is probably irretrievable.
Netherlands: July-December 2029
The Netherlands also had a lucrative double tax treaty with Russia that Moscow cancelled in late 2022, with the two countries previously enjoying good relations in the energy and other sectors. That has diminished from bilateral trade worth about €20 billion in 2019 to €3.8 billion in 2024. Both countries energy sectors have recovered, while the on-going EU focus of the Netherlands makes it unlikely much rapprochement with Russia is achievable.
Slovakia: January-June 2030
Slovakia is largely pro-Russian, much to the chagrin of many of its EU partners. Much of this lies with traditional energy and trade supplies from Russia, while despite its EU membership, relations have remained warm. In 2022, bilateral trade reached slightly over €5 billion, mainly in Russian energy imports. By 2024, this figure had remained constant. Bratislava will want to remain in Russia’s orbit and will be looking to increase trade and diplomatic ties.
Malta: July-December 2030
Malta is the EU’s smallest country and generally does what it is told to by Brussels. However, it has a sizeable Russian expatriate diaspora, mostly digital nomads engaged in the gaming IT sector. It will not want to rock its local business community as concerns Russian nationals, while being seen to toe the EU’s overall policies.
Summary
The upcoming EU Presidential nations over the coming five years represent a bit of a mixed bag for Moscow but will probably be less anti-Russian rhetoric driven than they have been in the past. It should also be noticed that none of the countries concerned have significant trade clout with Moscow, a legacy of the massive sanctions and exiting from the Russian supply chains that many European nations endorsed. That has cost them not just revenues, but both trade and diplomatic leverage with Moscow. It should be noted that current Russian trade with Nigeria for example is more than many of the EU nations mentioned.
That said, there does appear to be a groundswell of disapproval developing from several European business communities, some of them represented above, who may begin to start questioning their own governments political views of Russia. This will be especially true should, as seems possible, a lasting peace treaty be negotiated between Russia and Ukraine, brokered by the United States.
It also appears true that the US President Trump is highly critical of Europe’s policies towards Russia, saying in his view that the conflict would not have occurred were he in office at that time. Multiple European leaders were also highly critical of Trump’s first term in office; with such attitudes now likely to rebound back upon them. This new narrative, with rather less ambivalence towards Europe than in the past may also begin to shape European policies, and especially attitudes towards Moscow. The Kremlin’s relationships with the countries in line to take on the European Presidency could all, with one or two exceptions, certainly be improved. Natural and long-lasting ties with the Greek and Italians in particular may well prove to be new fertile ground – however there is also the issue of anti-Russian views still permeating throughout their governments. This suggests some shocks may be in store as European business communities wish to regain lost ground, economies certainly require a boost, yet cold war political attitudes remain incumbent. The prognosis is that the EU could well be in for a rocky road over the coming five years. How Moscow reacts will be telling.
Further Reading
